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Registros recuperados: 4.365 | |
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Valcu, Adriana M.; Kling, Catherine L.. |
The goal of watershed scale analysis is to assign to each field unit the best set of agricultural practices in order to achieve a maximum outcome from both environmental and economic perspectives. Watershed physically based models linked to multiobjective optimization models can overcome the high dimensionality of watershed pollution problem. Market based instruments such as permit trading settings which consider abatement measures’ cost heterogeneity have been regarded as being superior to command and control programs. Empirical analysis reveals that when local environmental authority and farmers have different cost information, a permit trading program has the potential to offer cost savings. |
Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Environmental Economics and Policy. |
Ano: 2011 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/103719 |
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Karp, Larry S.; Zhao, Jinhua. |
A reform to the Kyoto Protocol that allows signatories to pay a fine instead of meeting the target level of abatement would achieve three goals. First, it would defuse one U.S. objection to the agreement: the concern that the cost of achieving the target might turn out to be extremely high. Second, unlike other cost-reducing measures (such as trade in pollution permits) it would increase the equilibrium number of signatories in a non-cooperative participation game. Third, it would make it easier to force signatories to comply with their obligations. We study the participation game under an escape clause using both a Nash Equilibrium and the concept of a stable set when nations are “farsighted”. We compare our results to a prominent model of International... |
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Environmental Economics and Policy. |
Ano: 2007 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/6857 |
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Registros recuperados: 4.365 | |
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